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JURISDICTION TO TAX INCOME
EDWARD S. STIMSON
People of the State of New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves1 recently decided
by the United States Supreme Court involves the interesting question of
what state or states may tax income. A woman in New York owned a life
estate in real estate situated in New Jersey. She received rents from this
property which were paid to and collected by her agent in New Jersey. She
was compelled by the State of New York to pay a tax on this income pursuant
to a statute imposing a tax upon the "entire net income" of residents of the
state. The Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, held that New York
could constitutionally impose the tax.
Only three months before this decision, the Supreme Court in People of
the State of New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves2 held that the state which
had physical power over the source of the income could tax it. A man in
Massachusetts owned a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. When
the number of seats or memberships was increased, he received a fraction
of a seat as his share. He sold his right, thereby receiving income. The
Court held that New York could tax the income without violating the Con-
stitution.
If all states can tax persons living in their territory on income from
foreign sources and persons living outside of their territory on income from
domestic sources, persons deriving income from states other than that in
which they live will often be compelled to pay two taxes on the same income
in addition to the federal tax. In a long line of cases beginning with Louis-
ville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentuckys the Supreme Court has held
that double taxation resulting from taxes imposed by two states of the United
States, both of which would otherwise have jurisdiction to tax, is a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4
In the principal case and in its opinion in Lawrence v. State Tax Commis-
siotn of Mississippi,5 an earlier decision on which it relied, the Court took
the position that a state having power 6 over an individual could tax him for
157 Sup. Ct. 466 (March 1, 1937). [See note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 93 on the
decision in the New York Court of Appeals.-Ed.]
257 Sup. Ct. 237 (Jan. 4, 1937).
3188 U. S. 385 (1903).
'First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932) and cases cited in STIMSON,
JURISDICTION AND PowER oF TAXATION (1933) p. 4 n. 9.
'286 U. S. 276 (1932). In this case, a contractor who was a citizen and resident of
Mississippi derived income from the construction of public highways in Tennessee.
Mississippi taxed this income and the Supreme Court sustained it.
'Justice Stone said domicile afforded a basis for taxation. It never has except for in-
heritance taxes. In this field, domicile is considered a basis for imposing the tax because
of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32
N. E. 1096 (1893), where the dissenting opinion by Judge Gray is the only opinion. See
STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND PowER OF TAXATION (1933) pp. 76-79 and p. 6 n. 11.
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the protection and benefits7 which he received from the government and could
measure the tax by the entire net income received by him regardless of its
source. As a matter of physical power, this would be equally true of a
property tax, for the tax can be regarded as one imposed on an individual
subject to the physical power of the state and measured by the value of his
property wherever situated." When a person in one state owns property
situated in another state, both states, in the absence of a supervening consti-
tutional limitation, have the physical power to exact a tax, the one by
seizing the property and the other by physical suasion of the owner.9 In this
respect, income taxes are not different from property taxes. The state having
power over the property which is the source of the income or over the payor
of the income can, by seizure of the property or corporeal suasion of the
payor, withhold a portion of the income; and the state having power over
the person receiving the income can force him to pay.10 If it is unfair and
a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for two
states, each having physical power to do so, to impose a property tax, then,
likewise, it is unfair and contrary to due process for two states, each having
corporeal power to do so, to exact an income tax.
This is exactly what the Supreme Court itself held in Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina." This forgotten case, the first decided by the Su-
'It would seem that all the Court meant here was that taxes must be for a public
purpose which it is hoped will benefit those in the territory and not that it is essential
that the particular taxpayer be benefited. Obviously, it did not intend to suggest that
it was necessary that the tax be measured by the benefit received. See HARDING, DOUBLE
TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933) § 4.
'STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933) p. 2 n. 6. In Fidelity and
Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917) at p. 58 Justice Holmes said:
"The present tax is a tax upon the person, as is shown by the form of suit, and is
imposed it may be presumed for the general advantages of living within the jurisdiction.
These advantages, if the state so chooses, may be measured more or less by reference
to the riches of the person taxed." Dissenting in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929) he said at p. 97: "Taxes generally are imposed upon persons
for the general advantages of living within the jurisdiction, not upon property, although
generally measured more or less by reference to the riches of the person taxed, on
grounds not of fiction but of fact.... The notion that the property must be within the
jurisdiction puts the emphasis on the wrong thing."
'Prior to Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania,
198 U. S. 341 (1905) and the better known case of Union Transit Company v. Ken-
tucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905) both the state in which tangible property was situated and
the state in which the owner was located could impose a property tax. STIMSoN, JURIS-
DICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933) pp. 9-10 and 18-20.
"Maguire, Relief from Double Taxation of Personal Incomes (1923) 32 Yale Law
Journal 757, pp. 760-769; STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933) p. 86.
u283 U. S. 123 (1931). The same result reached in Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S.
422 (1935) seems to have been due to the admission of counsel for the state of Ohio that
if the Ohio cestui had an interest in the Illinois lands held in trust, a tax on the income
which he received from the trust would be a tax on land situated without the state
which was prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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preme Court of the four here discussed, was not cited in the opinions subse-
quently rendered. The facts were that a foreign corporation was doing
business in North Carolina and, therefore, according to well accepted prin-
ciples, was subject to its power. All of its manufacturing operations were
carried on in North Carolina, but sales were made throughout the United
States, Canada, and Europe. North Carolina imposed an income tax on
a proportion of the corporation's net income determined by the ratio of the
value of its real estate and tangible personal property in the state to the
value of all of its real estate and tangible personal property.
So calculated, the assessments for the years in question were 66% to
85% of the corporation's entire net income. The corporation introduced
evidence to show that its income was derived from three sources, to wit, (1)
buying profit, (2) manufacturing profit, and (3) selling profit, and that
not more than 21% of its earnings could be attributed to North Carolina.
The Supreme Court held that the application of the statutory method was
arbitrary and unreasonable "in attributing to North Carolina a percentage
of income out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted" there.
Since North Carolina had power over the corporation, it had, in the
absence of a supervening constitutional limitation, power or jurisdiction to
tax the entire income.1 2 The decision is, then, that a state having power
over the receiver of income is prohibited by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from taxing income derived from sources outside of
the state. It is not only a decision that only one state can tax but also a
choice of the state having power over the source of the income as the one
entitled to impose an income tax instead of the state having power over
the person receiving the income.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court should follow its decision in this
case not only in holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the taxation of income by more than one state but also in
choosing the state which is the source of the income as the one which may
tax it.13
'Maguire v. Trefy, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF
TAXATION (1933) pp. 86-90; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305
(1892); Pembia Consolidated Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S.
181 (1888) ; STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933) p. 14.
'Professor Harding thinks so too. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND
INCOME (1933) pp. 209-210; State Jurisdiction to Tax Dividends and Stock Profits to
Natural Persons (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 139, 169. So does Mr. Tuller. TULLER, THE
TAXING POWER-STATE INCOME TAXATION (1937) c. 14.
